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INTRODUCTION 
This Article revives and defends a largely discredited history of 
professionalism.  It argues that the rhetoric of the professions at the 
turn of the twentieth century provided immigrants, minorities, 
women, and outsiders of all sorts with an imagined route to 
citizenship.  This rhetoric combined with the partially open doors of 
the profession helped people to move from the periphery to the 
center.  It helped newcomers, who were viewed as at best irrelevant 
and at worst a burden on America, to transcend their role as outsiders 
and see themselves as architects of a new and just social order.  It also 
provided a way for women and minorities to translate their 
experience on the periphery into a new vision for the American 
polity.  Professionalism, in other words, served an important function.  
 
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; Ph.D. University of Chicago; 
J.D. Harvard Law School.  I am grateful to Elizabeth Chambliss, Doni Gewirtzman, 
Bruce Green, James Grimmelman, Molly Land, Ed Purcell, and Ruti Teitel for their 
comments on this Article.  The Article also benefited from the thoughtful response of 
the participants in the Fordham Law School Conference, The Law: Business or 
Profession? The Continuing Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for Law Practice in 
the Twenty-First Century. 
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It provided a growingly diverse and intensely divided country with an 
arena in which to negotiate these differences and translate them into 
a common language. 
For years, historians and sociologists have reminded us of just how 
harmful professionalism can be.  They have ably and powerfully 
documented the abuses committed in the name of the professional 
ideal.  But relatively few in recent years have uncovered or even 
recognized professionalism’s more beneficial side.1  This Article seeks 
to correct that distortion.  In doing so, it begins what will hopefully be 
an ongoing effort to use history to identify aspects of profession and 
the rhetoric that accompanies it that are worth preserving. 
Professionalism is such an elastic concept that it can and has served 
many different purposes over the years.  Some of those purposes have 
been pernicious—the rhetoric of the professions has, for example, 
been used to justify the exclusion of newcomers of all sorts, 
particularly ethnic and racial minorities and women.2  It has been 
used to create hierarchies within the profession and reinforce 
unjustified monopolies.3  But other purposes have been more benign.  
Professionalism, for instance, has also served as a repository for a 
certain version of the American Dream.4  It has stood for the ability 
of individuals on the outskirts to make their way, in one generation at 
most, to the inner circles of American society.5  The imagined role of 
professions was itself useful to those who fought to achieve status 
through professional advancement.  Not only did it provide 
motivation, it also supplied meaning for their pursuit. 
 
 1. Robert Gordon and William Simon are a notable exception. See Robert W. 
Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS’ 
IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROFESSION 230 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter LAWYERS’ 
IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES].  Bradley Wendel has also defended professionalism, 
although his concept of professionalism is a bit more specifically defined than the 
common use of the term. See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 
99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1168–76 (2006). 
 2. See Mark Galanter & Thomas Paley, The Transformation of the Big Law 
Firm, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 31, 39. 
 3. See Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal 
Professionalism, 1925-1960, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES, supra note 
1, at 144, 148–49. 
 4. See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The 
Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ 
PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 177. 
 5. See id.  
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So, this Article argues, professionalism did not simply serve as a 
way to consolidate the power of a new middle class elite.  It did not 
grow, as the sociologist Andrew Abbott has suggested, solely from a 
monopolistic impulse—a way to lay claim to a jurisdiction and protect 
against the intrusion of other professions and occupations.6  It was 
not, as Jerold Auerbach has suggested, purely a product of the 
elitism, greed, and xenophobia of a particular social and economic 
class.7  Nor was it only a cultural process by which an emerging 
middle class defined itself and consolidated its power.8  Of course, 
exclusion and elitism were a big part of the story, but they were not 
the only part.  The blend of elitism and egalitarianism in the rhetoric 
of the professions allowed for a greater emphasis on the latter.  As 
such, immigrants, women, and other ethnic minorities could use the 
rhetoric of professionalism for their own purposes. 
After unearthing this more benign history of professionalism, this 
Article argues that this turn-of-the-twentieth-century version of 
professionalism is still relevant and desirable today.  The professions 
still serve as a receptacle for a version of the American Dream.  The 
rhetoric of the professions can still offer a mechanism for those who 
have lived, for whatever reason, at the edges of society to imagine 
their way in.  It can still provide a way for outsiders to translate their 
individual experiences into a common language that can change and 
benefit the country as a whole. 
Professionalism, like theories that enjoyed popularity at the end of 
the last century, was general—a system of thought, in which ethnic 
and religious difference did not matter.9  What mattered instead was a 
combination of intellect and moral fiber.10  Professionalism posited a 
system of merit in a world in which merit alone could not buy 
 
 6. See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE 
DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 5, 15–16 (1988). 
 7. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 88, 92, 99–102 (1976). 
 8. See BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE 
CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 31–39 (1946); 
SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM: 1885–1914, at 74, 84 (1957); 
ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877–1920, at 111–33 (1967); see also 
BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE “TRUE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL” IN AMERICA, A HISTORY 
198–300 (1981) (arguing that professionalism emerged not as a necessary part of 
industrialization but as a product of the late nineteenth century obsession with 
science); DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 35 
(1991). 
 9. See WIEBE, supra note 8, at 141. 
 10. See id. 
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success.11  Overt prejudice and networks of Anglo-Saxon white male 
power ensured that access to the professions only got you so far.12  
But professionalism—the idea of the unique role of professions in the 
polity—imagined away this reality.  It envisioned a world in which the 
professions—open to all who possessed the intellect and moral 
worth—provided a theoretical key to membership not just in those 
wood-paneled legal clubs but also in the nation as a whole.  Law, in 
theory, required its practitioners to both create and support the flesh 
and bones of the American system.  By practicing the law and 
preserving its integrity, attorneys proved not only their allegiance to 
the American system but also their centrality to it.  How better to 
earn acceptance than to catapult from the periphery to the center?  
The mechanism was not exactly a professional degree.  It was a 
degree coupled with rhetoric about what that degree meant. 
As we face a massive change in the nature of the legal profession in 
the years to come, exploring the history of professionalism is, 
perhaps, more important than ever.  As we experience rapid and 
intense shifts in the economics of the profession, our understanding of 
the professions and their proper role in society will certainly change.  
It is, this Article argues, important to retain some version of the 
professional ideal because it has been and can be useful.  But we must 
also remain thoughtful and critical about it at the same time.  We 
ought to work to preserve the useful purposes of professionalism 
while shedding the antiquated and destructive ones.  It is worth 
building on and developing the profession in light of its (good) ideals 
and revisiting and discarding the relics of its more destructive 
purposes.  By exploring the role that professionalism has played, we 
are better equipped to preserve and perpetuate the good things about 
it, while discarding its outdated or destructive elements. 
For decades, scholars have observed that the legal profession has 
become increasingly segmented.13  There are services for the rich and 
those for the poor.  There are lawyers for fancy corporate clients and 
lawyers for individuals.  There are bespoke services and commodified 
ones.14  Recently, this observation has come in vogue.  Some 
 
 11. See Christine Parker & Tanina Rostain, Law Firms, Global Capital, and the 
Sociological Imagination, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2347, 2356–58 (2012) (summarizing 
the functionalist approach to the professions). 
 12. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
39–42 (2002). 
 13. See Andy Boon et al., Postmodern Professions? The Fragmentation of Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 473, 486 (2005). 
 14. See id. at 481–82. 
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journalists and legal theorists have criticized law schools, in part, for 
failing to recognize this divide.15  Critics, such as Brian Tamanaha, 
suggest that law schools ought to track the market and cater their 
education to the likely careers of their graduates.16  Personal injury 
lawyers, they say, do not need fancy theory.  They don’t need classes 
in jurisprudence or even professors who dabble in that esoteric 
world.17  This Article serves as a reminder that the idea and rhetoric 
of a unified profession (while never really accurate) has been useful.18  
It has provided a way for those on the outside of our society to 
imagine a way in.  Segmentation poses a threat to that.  In envisioning 
both the nature of the profession and education, we should bear this 
in mind. 
Part I of this Article provides some background on the history of 
the professions and recounts how historians and sociologists have 
analyzed the role of the professions and the rhetoric of 
professionalism in American history.  Part II explores the life and 
work of Julius Henry Cohen, a prominent Jewish lawyer who wrote 
about the profession in the early decades of the twentieth century.  
Cohen’s musings on the profession as well as his life and work as a 
lawyer illustrate the historical point that minorities have used the 
rhetoric of the professions to imagine their own ascent to leadership. 
Cohen helped develop a discourse of professionalism to transcend 
the crippling particularity of his circumstances and define a route to 
citizenship in somewhat hostile territory.  In his book, The Law: 
Business or Profession?, Julius Henry Cohen used and developed this 
rhetoric of inclusion to create a brand of professionalism that not only 
accepted him but in some way needed him.19  Cohen, a Jew and an 
immigrant living in turn-of-the-century New York, used 
professionalism to carve out a position for himself (and other 
 
 15. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 167–83 (2012). 
 16. See id. at 174. 
 17. See id. at 172–74. 
 18. The rhetoric of a unified profession was never accurate and, as David Wilkins 
has pointed out, has led the bar to resist the increasingly specialized and contextual 
nature of legal work. See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating 
Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1209, 1217–18 (1993).  While I 
advocate the idea of a unified profession in this Article, I agree that the bar needs to 
abandon that notion for the purposes of ethics and write rules that acknowledge the 
different types of work that lawyers do. See Rebecca Roiphe, The Ethics of Willful 
Ignorance, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 187, 207 (2010). 
 19. See JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 242 (1916). 
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outsiders) in America.20  He used professionalism strategically to 
blanch out difference and imagine a national identity for himself in a 
world that still discriminated against him because of his religion.21  
Once he achieved a certain status in the profession, Cohen did not 
abandon his experience as an outsider.22  He associated poor ethical 
conduct within the profession not with ethnic identity but with a lack 
of education or merit.23  By doing so, he used the rhetoric of the 
professions to proclaim the potential for human transformation.  He 
used professionalism to argue and fight for the removal of permanent 
barriers to admission and success.  In the same breath, he drew on the 
rhetoric of the professions to replace fixed barriers to success with 
contingent categories that individuals of whatever creed could 
transcend with hard work, dedication, and a strong moral sense.24 
The Article concludes that Cohen was not simply an antiquated 
product of a hegemonic vision of America as a melting pot, in which 
difference gradually disappeared and made way for the Anglo-Saxon 
ideal.  The idea of a unified profession can continue to serve a critical 
and beneficial purpose in the American imagination.  In a country 
that has tasted the value of multiculturalism—a world that (mostly) 
respects rather than despises difference—there is a way of preserving 
the legal profession as a means of social integration without adopting 
the cultural hegemony of Cohen’s era or the arrogance of the melting 
pot ideal.  To make this argument, Part III briefly reviews the 
political science literature on assimilation and multiculturalism.  The 
historical attack on professionalism in the 1970s and 1980s captured a 
contemporary political attack on the idea of assimilation.25  It 
reflected a new liberal ideal, which embraced multiculturalism and 
pluralism.26  Since then, political scientists have modified their 
understanding of multiculturalism, arguing that it is still possible to 
celebrate diversity without abandoning the search for shared values.27  
This section of the Article seeks to bring this more nuanced 
 
 20. For a detailed analysis of Cohen’s life and work, see Samuel J. Levine, 
Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins of the Business/Profession 
Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth Century Legal 
Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 11–13 (2005). 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. See infra notes 230–39 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra notes 230–39 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 243–56 and accompanying text. 
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commitment to the multicultural ideal back into the debate over 
professionalism.  This Article concludes that the professions can play 
a critical part in a world which respects difference but seeks and 
embraces substantive common values at the same time.  The legal 
profession, in particular, can play an important role in negotiating and 
translating values in a heterogeneous world and working toward this 
set of shared goals. 
Cohen’s story offers a cautionary tale.  Without grasping onto 
outdated entry requirements and rules that create unfair monopolies, 
lawyers should try to define core skills and values that form the 
essence of the profession and preserve those values as the profession 
goes through what seem like fairly convulsive changes.  One of those 
values is the coherence of the profession, the notion that lawyers 
engaged in all different sorts of work share a common pursuit—that 
they all in some way seek to improve their community—whether it is 
local, national, international, or even virtual. 
I.  THE PROFESSIONS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
A. A Short History of the Professions in America 
I am writing an Article about professionalism rather than the 
professions.  In other words, I am using Julius Henry Cohen to help 
understand the role the idea of the professions played in the 
American imagination.  To do that, however, it is helpful to briefly 
sketch the history of the American professions and the rhetoric 
surrounding them.  It is impossible, of course, to untangle one from 
the other. 
At the time of the founding, lawyers enjoyed an exalted role.28  The 
idea of law as a public profession thrived.  A tradition of 
“republicanism” gave lawyers a sense of public purpose.29  They were, 
as Tocqueville later explained, an American substitute for the 
 
 28. See Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer—A Brief Informal History of a 
Myth with Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1183–84 (2009) 
[hereinafter Gordon, Citizen Lawyer]. 
 29. See id. at 1200; Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. 
REV. 1, 14 (1988) [hereinafter Gordon, Independence]; Russell G. Pearce, 
Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 241, 241 (1992) [hereinafter Pearce, Rediscovering]; Russell G. Pearce, The 
Legal Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, 
and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1346–50 (2006). 
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aristocracy.30  Lawyers were to defend the legal system from the 
inevitable incursions by executive tyrants, populist mobs, or factions 
of economic or social interests.31  They would recommend reform in 
the law to strengthen it against attack.32  They would ensure that the 
law adapted to the changing landscape before opportunistic groups 
took advantage of the lag.33  Lawyers were particularly suited to this 
high calling at the time.  They were statesmen and scholars, 
gentlemen adept at oratory and part of an educated literary class.34  
This group of elite lawyers would, in theory, help the people preserve 
and fulfill their own customs and values.  At the time, professionalism 
mandated that only lawyers possessed the talent to read the common 
law and dictate how men should behave toward one another and the 
community as a whole.  As the historian Robert Gordon has 
explained, “the legal elite was to help the People guard their 
collective customary wisdom and realize their historical destiny as 
Americans.”35 
The early nineteenth century posed a challenge to this paternalistic 
understanding of the lawyer’s role.  In the general democratizing zeal 
of the Jacksonian period, lawyers were easy targets.36  Radical 
democrats sought to reform the law and make it accessible to all.37  
They hoped that doing so would minimize the need for a legal 
profession.38  It would reduce the status of lawyers as a special class 
with unique responsibilities to preserve the legal system and promote 
justice.39  Politicians and reformers insisted that just about anyone 
with natural gifts and ambition could practice law.40  As this view grew 
 
 30. See Gordon, Citizen Lawyer, supra note 28, at 1183–84 (citing ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans., Arlington House 
Press 1966) (1835) (“[M]embers of the legal profession . . . constitute the only 
aristocratic body which can check the irregularities of the people.”)). 
 31. See Gordon, Independence, supra note 29, at 14. 
 32. See id. at 17. 
 33. See id. at 13–14; see also Pearce, Rediscovering, supra note 29, at 242. 
 34. See Gordon, Independence, supra note 29, at 32. 
 35. Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of 
American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN 
AMERICA 70, 84 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) [hereinafter Gordon, Legal Thought]. 
 36. See Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 35, at 83–86; Aziz Rana, Statesman or 
Scribe? Legal Independence and the Problem of Democratic Citizenship, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1665, 1694–1700 (2009). 
 37. See Rana, supra note 36, at 1695–96. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 35, at 83. 
 40. See id. 
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to dominate, the British classes of solicitors and barristers were 
eliminated.41  Bar associations and clubs were dismantled.42  Entry 
requirements were stripped away,43 and lawyers’ political power 
subsided for a time.44 
The Civil War posed a crisis to traditional understandings of 
professionalism.45  As Norman Spaulding has elegantly explained: 
Elite lawyers active in the professionalization movement of the 
Gilded Age kept looking for social stages on which to enact the role 
of Tocqueville’s lawyer-aristocrats.  But the social stages they sought 
out were different, more humble, than the stage implied by the 
strongest version of antebellum professional ideals. . . .  [T]he 
profession retreated to organizational structures that provided 
collective, less directly political, venues in which to secure 
professional authority.46 
The legal elite still envisioned itself as a leading force in society, 
but Spaulding argues that it shifted focus from direct political 
engagement to supplying scientific expert knowledge to government 
and business.47 
After the Civil War, the rapid expansion of the market and the 
growth of big cities rendered interactions impersonal and 
unpredictable.48  Networks of trusted friends and business partners 
gave way to anonymous corporate interactions.49  The anonymity was 
accompanied by what at the time seemed an alarming stratification.50  
Progressive era reformers sought to bring not only order and 
 
 41. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 40 (1989). 
 42. See id. at 45–48. 
 43. See id. at 40–41. 
 44. See J. WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS 
298 (1950).  For my purposes, I will focus on the late-nineteenth century to the 
present, the period in which the professions in general and the legal profession in 
particular gained national prominence. 
 45. See KIMBALL, supra note 8, at 201. 
 46. Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politics and 
Professionalism During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2001, 2094 (2005) (internal quotations omitted).  Spaulding argues that the legal 
profession experienced a crisis in legitimacy as the law degenerated into a political 
battle over secession.  He argues that the profession retreated during Reconstruction 
into a fairly conservative consensus about the meaning of federalism in order to 
restore professional status. Id. 
 47. See id. at 2095. 
 48. See id. at 2096; see KIMBALL, supra note 8, at 200. 
 49. See WIEBE, supra note 8, at 81. 
 50. See generally STEVEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE 
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920 (1982). 
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efficiency but also morality to the growingly diffuse and diverse 
national community.51  Against this backdrop, lawyers grew to 
national prominence once more.  The need for a special class to 
mediate the interests of the wealthy and the poor, the government 
and its citizens, gained renewed urgency.52  Thriving off of the late-
nineteenth century fascination with science and expertise, national 
organizations grew to protect and promote the interests of lawyers.53  
Unlike the Whig predecessors, the legal elite justified its special role 
in society not as a product of lawyers’ position as statesmen, not as a 
result of their superior knowledge of the common law, but rather as a 
result of the ability to refine liberal legal science and engage in the 
expert management of public affairs.54 
The shift in rhetoric may be due in part to the crisis in the Civil 
War, as Norman Spaulding argues.55  But it seems likely also to have 
shifted as a result of the changes in lawyers’ work.  Just as lawyers 
experienced this renaissance, their daily work was changing 
significantly.  The great trial lawyers and orators of the nineteenth 
century were gradually being replaced by business experts who spent 
more time practicing in offices than advocating in courts.56  Experts 
with specialized knowledge about the growing needs of business were 
gradually replacing the nineteenth century generalists who argued in 
the same breath for clients and legal reform.57  This new zenith in 
professional power and prestige was accompanied by the decline of 
professional independence.58  The web of government agencies and 
 
 51. See Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REVS. AM. HIST. 113 
(1982).  In his book on the emergence of the American Social Science Association, 
Haskell argues that the growth of the professions was a response to a general shift in 
understanding of human motivation.  The growing interdependence of society, he 
argues, led to a crisis in conventional understandings about human motivation, will, 
and causality. See THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 234–56 (1977). 
 52. See BLEDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 80–92. 
 53. See id. at 84–87. 
 54. See Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 35, at 97. 
 55. See Spaulding, supra note 46, at 2012–19. 
 56. See id. at 2010–11. 
 57. See Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and 
Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870–1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: 
LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 60 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) 
[hereinafter Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual]. 
 58. See id. 
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the increasingly powerful nature of corporate clients encroached on 
lawyers’ control over their life and work.59 
In the late nineteenth century, most lawyers worked as solo 
practitioners.60  They gained expertise and entrance to the profession 
through apprenticeships.61  In the early years of the twentieth century, 
the bar began to impose educational requirements.62  It started to 
restrict entry to the profession to citizens.63  As Chair of the New 
York County Lawyers Association (NYCLA) Committee on the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law, Cohen himself was a part of the 
movement to define a distinct and protected area of practice for 
lawyers.64  Along with other elite members of the profession, he urged 
the various bar associations to exclude bar corporations and laymen 
from practicing law.65 
In addition to educational requirements and entry restrictions, the 
legal profession sought to regulate its own conduct.66  In the name of 
preserving independence, the bar drafted the Canons of Professional 
Ethics, which were soon adopted by most states.67  In doing so, the 
legal elite created rules against solicitation, advertising, and 
contingent fees that made it harder for solo practitioners in 
metropolitan areas to subsist.68  It developed a division between the 
elite of the profession and everybody else by setting up rules that 
were almost impossible for most lawyers, particularly those practicing 
alone in urban areas, to follow.69  The growth in tort litigation that 
accompanied the expansion of factories and railroads also contributed 
to the divide between lawyers for corporations and lawyers for 
individuals.70  It too led to a drive to reform and limit the scope and 
power of plaintiffs’ attorneys.71 
 
 59. See Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the 
Attorney General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1948–49 (2008). 
 60. See ABEL, supra note 41, at 11. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. at 12. 
 64. See Reducing Litigation: Movement of New York County Lawyers’ 
Association Against Legal Quacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1922. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 40–73. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. at 43–48. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 29–31, 349–50. 
 71. See id. 
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At the turn of the twentieth century, the legal profession secured 
its national identity as an elite group with political, economic, and 
social power once again.  Lawyers, it seemed, would control not only 
the application of the law but also its creation and its meaning.72  
From the very moment of its greatest power and prestige, the bar 
experienced pressure to open its doors to newer members of society.73  
The expanding, heterogeneous, urban culture seemed to be knocking 
at the door of inherited privilege.   
But the powerful elite did not give in so easily.74  After World War 
II, the professions, like many other arenas of American society, felt 
the push for inclusion and democratic egalitarianism.75  More diverse 
people had access to higher education and were pursuing law 
degrees.76  The bar had an increasingly hard time keeping them out.77  
Thus, the Whig-Federalist rhetoric of exclusion and the Jacksonian 
critique seemed to coexist in an uneasy balance.78 
Few historians have explored the period following the early 
consolidation of the legal profession.  Rayman Solomon argues that 
the concept of professionalism and its sense of perpetual crisis 
remained fairly constant up until the 1960s.79  The bar raised familiar 
cries against the unauthorized practice of law, solicitation, and 
advertising.80  Leaders among the bar demanded a greater 
independence from market forces, independence from client 
demands, autonomy from the partisan politics, and dedication to the 
public.81  Historical events such as prohibition, the Great Depression, 
President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan, and McCarthyism posed a 
challenge to the ideals of the profession and produced a renewed call 
for lawyers to commit to bringing the values of the profession into 
practice.82 
 
 72. See Gerald W. Gawalt, Introduction to THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN 
POST CIVIL-WAR AMERICA vii–viii (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984). 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. at viii; see also AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 23–28. 
 75. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 23–28; MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM 
PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY 
BAR ASSOCIATION xvii (1988). 
 76. See POWELL, supra note 75, at xvii. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See Samuel Haber, The Professions, in II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN 
SOCIAL HISTORY 1573, 1582 (Mary K. Cayton et al. eds., 1993). 
 79. See Solomon, supra note 3, at 144–45. 
 80. See id. at 151. 
 81. See id. at 152–53. 
 82. See id. at 154–68. 
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As the profession worked its way into contemporary times, the 
corporate bar seemed to have drifted further from the service ideal.  
The structure of law firms has made it difficult for informal networks 
to enforce social norms.83  Corporate lawyers abandoned the long-
range social interest of the corporate client in favor of immediate 
benefits.84  Perhaps, as some have argued, the public service ideal has 
not been lost but rather migrated to more specialized areas of 
practice.85 
The practice of law has grown increasingly diverse and knowledge 
increasingly specialized.86  Globalization and new technology have 
driven lawyers to compete more wildly for clients.87  These forces 
have, among other things, contributed to increasingly stark 
segmentation in the profession—between bespoke and commodified 
services, services for global law firms and those for individuals.88  
These trends threaten the concept of professionalism.  It is hard to 
identify one profession when the practice of law looks so different 
depending on the area of practice.  The segmentation of the 
profession, too, threatens to create a permanent divide that 
challenges the notion of professionalism. 
B. The Professions and Professionalism: A Historiography 
Historians have long debated the ascent of the professions in the 
late nineteenth century (and the rhetoric surrounding it).  In the years 
after World War II, liberal thinkers tended to celebrate the 
professions along with expertise in general and the source of both 
material and social progress.89  According to Talcott Parsons, the 
 
 83. See MILTON C. REGAN, EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET 
LAWYER 37 (2004); see also Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic 
Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 
1867–76 (2008). 
 84. See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor 
After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1209–10 (2003). 
 85. See Gordon, Independence, supra note 29, at 65–68. 
 86. For overviews of this trend, see Robert W. Gordon, The Legal Profession, in 
LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 287, 289–94 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002) and 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 190–93 
(1999). 
 87. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Two Questions for Law Schools About the Future 
Boundaries of the Legal Profession, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 329, 339–50 (2012). 
 88. See id. at 339. 
 89. See generally HURST, supra note 44; TALCOTT PARSONS, ESSAYS IN 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1954). 
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professions were the most critical component of modern society.90  
Increasingly effective and important, professionals were essentially 
apolitical experts seeking to coordinate the country’s progress.91  They 
served a function by providing, as Emile Durkheim argued, a solution 
to the woes of modern society.92  Dedicated to the good of all, 
professionals could moderate the effect of so many egoistic selfish 
impulses.93  Parsons explained professional ethics (and particularly the 
monopoly control over the profession) as a necessary part of the 
profession’s function as a fiduciary.94  Clients, according to Parsons, 
were unable to assess the quality of lawyers’ expert services.95  
Professional ethics and monopoly restrictions were necessary to 
ensure that lawyers are serving their fiduciary responsibility to clients. 
Ever since, generations of historians and sociologists have criticized 
this argument, demonstrating the problems inherent in professional 
authority and the ideological role the professions play.  In the 1960s 
and 1970s, neo-Marxist scholars argued that the professions in 
general, and the legal profession in particular, emerged in the late-
nineteenth century as an organized force because lawyers were useful 
in consolidating the power of industrial capitalists.96  Professional 
ethics served more as a source of social control than anything else.97  
Corporate capitalists needed to frame their own economic interests in 
the legitimating language of the law, and the legal profession leant its 
expertise and the badge of both respectability and selflessness to the 
capitalists’ uniquely selfish endeavor.98  Weberian sociologists 
similarly viewed the ideology of the professions with skepticism, 
 
 90. See PARSONS, supra note 89, at 34, 270. 
 91. See Gerald L. Geison, Introduction to PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL 
IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA, supra note 35, at 3 (citing Talcott Parsons, Professions, in 
12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 545 (David Sills ed., 
1968)). 
 92. See EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 10–14 
(Cornelia Brookfield trans., 1958). 
 93. See id. 
 94. See PARSONS, supra note 89, at 381. 
 95. See id. at 372–80. 
 96. See generally JEFFREY L. BERLANT, PROFESSIONS AND MONOPOLY (1975); 
MARGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
(1977); see also John A. Matzko, “The Best Men of the Bar”: The Founding of the 
American Bar Association, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS, supra note 57, at 75 (arguing 
that the American Bar Association was founded by an elite that was anxious about its 
status given the growing power of immigrants, corporate clients, and other 
professions). 
 97. See Matzko, supra note 96, at 78–80. 
 98. See id. 
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arguing that the legal profession rhetorically wedded its special 
knowledge and expertise to the pursuit of justice as a way to justify its 
social ascent.99  They interpreted the rise of the professions as part of 
a class quest for both social status and wealth.100 
These historians of the legal profession have chronicled how 
leaders of the bar pushed to limit admission and prevent external 
regulation.  Monopoly control was not, as functionalists like Parsons 
had argued, a benign way to ensure quality in the profession but 
rather a sinister cog in the mechanism of social control.101  In the early 
twentieth century, lawyers sought to secure their ranks and reinforce 
the exclusivity of their club by locking the door to newcomers, 
especially those with a different race, ethnicity, or gender.102  To do 
so, this elite had to control the educational institutions, the licensing 
bodies, certifying agencies, and regulatory bodies.103  By controlling 
bar associations, elite lawyers were able to make it harder for the new 
class to intrude.  These lawyers wrote rules against contingency fees, 
advertising, and solicitation.104  They sought, in other words, to create 
their own monopoly.  Yet at the same time, the leaders of the bar 
eliminated the most obvious badges of a privileged class.105  They 
trumpeted education as way to eradicate the networks of privilege 
that existed among the wealthy established class.106 
In the late 1980s, historians added layers of complication to this 
story by looking at the professions in context.  They explained the 
emergence of modern professions as a part of the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century ambivalence about meritocracy and elitism.107  
The professions, as several of these historians argued, grew up amidst 
 
 99. For an overview of Weber’s contribution to the idea of professionalism, see 
ABEL, supra note 41, at 14–30. See, e.g., LARSON, supra note 96, at 34; see also KEITH 
M. MACDONALD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 29 (1995). 
 100. See ABEL, supra note 41, at 14–30. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See Maxwell H. Bloomfield, Law: The Development of a Profession, in THE 
PROFESSIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 33 (Nathan O. Hatch ed., 1988); Haber, supra 
note 78, at 1582.  For a history of these monopoly restrictions, see Bruce A. Green, 
The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their 
Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 
1115, 1118–40 (2000). 
 103. See ABEL, supra note 41, at 47–73, 112–15; AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 3–7, 
12–13, 40–74; FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 39–41. 
 104. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 39–41. 
 105. See id. at 33–39. 
 106. See id. at 37. 
 107. See id. 
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that tension.108  Not simply a tool of the new industrial classes, the 
professions served a more complex function by organizing and 
commandeering knowledge in order to consolidate power.109  Because 
they were organized around merit and skill rather than privilege and 
wealth, the professions provided a radically egalitarian way of seeking 
status.110  In other words, at least theoretically, the professions were 
open to all, which threatened to render status a fluid concept. 
As Samuel Haber argues, the new middle class longing for status 
intensified rather than subsided amidst the increasingly consumer-
oriented, market-driven, competitive, and individualistic culture of 
turn-of-the-century America.111  This new world seemed hostile to 
inherited privilege, but the professions provided a pocket in which 
this oddly pre-modern elitism could thrive still, unmarred by the 
assault.112  At the same time, the rapid expansion of corporate 
capitalism threatened to replace professional status with wealth and 
power.113  The American Dream seemed to shift from achieving status 
through participation in a professional group to obtaining wealth 
through ingenuity.  The professions responded, according to 
sociologist Andrew Abbott, by intensifying monopolistic controls 
through ethical rules.114 
Professionalism has always had a moral component.  Even as (or 
perhaps especially as) the rhetoric of the professions shifted its 
emphasis on political leadership to technocratic expertise in the early 
twentieth century, leaders of the bar insisted that lawyers are not 
interested in their own gain but rather are concerned with their 
clients, the community, and justice.115  Most historians have cynically 
dismissed the moral rhetoric of professionalism as fundamentally 
 
 108. See Nathan O. Hatch, Introduction: The Professions in a Democratic Culture, 
in THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 102, at 3; see also 
BLEDSTEIN, supra note 8. 
 109. See JAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSOLE AND CLASSIFY: THE FRENCH PSYCHIATRIC 
PROFESSION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 10–11 (1987). 
 110. See BLEDSTEIN, supra note 8. 
 111. See SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE 
AMERICAN PROFESSIONS, 1750–1900, at xi (1988). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See Andrew Abbott, Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. SOC. 855, 875 (1983).  
Abbott argues that the push for greater monopoly restrictions tends to follow times 
of great stress to professional status.  He argues that the Canons responded to exactly 
this strain in the early part of the twentieth century. See id. at 875–77. 
 115. See Solomon, supra note 3, at 144–46. 
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disingenuous.116  Lawyers, they claim, deliberately described their 
mission as a moral one to justify the market control they exert over 
their own profession.117  But some historians have taken issue with 
this interpretation.  Robert Gordon, for instance, has argued that 
lawyers at the turn of the century did take their commitment to the 
public seriously in representing private clients.118  The language that 
professionals used to justify themselves is itself important.  While 
lawyers may fall terribly far from their aspirations, rhetoric can also 
function to inspire men and women to live up to a higher goal, to 
pursue a good beyond their own self-interest.119  Especially when 
doing so earns you not merely a place in heaven or the private 
satisfaction of self-sacrifice, but also a sense of belonging in and to 
that larger community. 
After the Civil War, the legal profession secured its national 
identity as an elite group with political, economic, and social power.120  
Lawyers, it seemed, would control not only the application of the law 
but also its creation and its meaning.121  From the very moment of its 
greatest power and prestige, the bar experienced pressure to open its 
doors to newer members of society.122  The expanding, heterogeneous, 
urban culture seemed to gradually knock at the door of inherited 
privilege and elitism.123  But the powerful elite did not give in so 
easily.124  After World War II, the professions, like many other areas 
of American society, felt the push for inclusion and democratic 
egalitarianism.  More diverse people had access to higher education 
 
 116. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 43–52 (criticizing the bar for excluding 
outsiders by heavily regulating and prohibiting the use of contingency fees); id. at 
106–09 (arguing that the bar raised educational requirements to restrict entry to 
those who already had power within the country and the profession); WILLIAM P. 
LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL 
EDUCATION 91–92 (1994) (arguing that the educational requirements of the 
professionalization project closed the profession to all but a small elite); POWELL, 
supra note 75, at 17–18 (arguing that bar membership requirements kept ethnic 
minorities from achieving certain rank in the profession). 
 117. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 102. 
 118. See Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual, supra note 57, at 51–52; see also 
KIMBALL, supra note 8, at 104–05 (arguing that the moral rhetoric of professionalism 
was not mere subterfuge but rather part of a process through which the group of 
lawyers defined itself). 
 119. See KIMBALL, supra note 8, at 104–05. 
 120. See Gawalt, supra note 72, at vi–vii. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. at viii; see generally AUERBACH, supra note 7. 
 123. See generally AUERBACH, supra note 7. 
 124. See id. 
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and were pursuing law degrees.125  The bar had an increasingly hard 
time resisting this trend.126   
Several recent historians have noted that these histories of the 
profession focus almost exclusively on the elite.127  While they 
mention other lawyers scrambling at the door of privilege, these 
studies neglect to examine the experience of other lawyers, like 
women, African-Americans, and solo practitioners.128  Scholars like 
Kenneth Mack and Susan Carle have described the work of lawyers 
outside the elite, and these case studies have done much to enrich our 
understanding of the profession and its history.129 
What even these historians have overlooked is how its mashed-up 
ideology left professionalism open to alternate interpretations and 
uses.  Julius Henry Cohen’s book on professionalism reminds us of 
the Jacksonian strand in the rhetoric of the professions.130  It 
demonstrates how newcomers could (and still can) use the language 
of professionalism in an effort not to defeat the more elitist reality but 
to find a back door in—an imagined route to becoming a part of that 
elite.  Cohen drew on the republican language of moral virtue and 
civic participation to invent a road for himself—not only to inclusion 
but to leadership in the American polity. 
Of course, we cannot forget the very real lessons of the neo-
Marxist historians.  But before we celebrate the demise of 
professionalism, it is worth remembering that professionalism has 
promised newcomers and outsiders a way to enter into the larger 
community.  It has offered them at least a promise that with enough 
hard work and determination, they too can join a small group of 
moral and intellectual leaders of the country.131  None of this is to 
 
 125. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 457–59. 
 126. See id.; AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 232; POWELL, supra note 75, at xvii. 
 127. See Kenneth W. Mack, A Social History of Everyday Practice: Sadie T.M. 
Alexander and the Incorporation of Black Women into the American Legal 
Profession, 1925-1960, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1405, 1409 (2002); see also, e.g., 
VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 5–6 (1998); KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN 
LAWYER IN AMERICA, 1638 TO THE PRESENT 249 (1986); Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, 
and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 98 
(2002). 
 128. See Mack, supra note 127, at 1409; see also DRACHMAN, supra note 127, at 5–
6; MORELLO, supra note 127, at 249; Carle, supra note 127, at 98. 
 129. See, e.g., Carle, supra note 127; Mack, supra note 127. 
 130. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 242. 
 131. Aziz Rana has argued that the governing role of lawyers is not necessarily 
elitist.  If we tap into an older tradition where all work is a site for moral and political 
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suggest that this is purely a good thing.  It is merely to point out that 
professional ideology reflects (and in turn helps create) important 
and complicated themes in American history.  Julius Henry Cohen 
reminds us that professionalism is, in addition to other things, a 
receptacle for a particularly American dream of self-invention: a 
dream of the past disappearing and the future becoming something of 
our own making. 
II.  JULIUS HENRY COHEN AND THE PROFESSIONALISM MELTING 
POT 
Julius Henry Cohen was born in Brooklyn, New York, in 1873.132  
At the age of twenty-three, he graduated from New York University 
and was admitted to the New York State Bar the following year.133  A 
prominent New York lawyer, Cohen served as counsel to the Transit 
Reform Committee of 100, the Merchants Association, and the Port 
Authority.134  In 1897, he investigated and prosecuted Asa Bird 
Gardiner, the corrupt Manhattan District Attorney who had deep ties 
to the Tammany Hall political machine.135  The New York Times 
labeled him the “controversy minimizer” as he worked to resolve the 
1910 garment workers strike.136  A prominent attorney with 
connections to the established elite members of the bar, Cohen was 
an influential and powerful lawyer in New York.137  He published his 
book, The Law: Business or Profession?, in 1916.138  Cohen was an 
active member of the NYCLA where he chaired the Committee on 
the Unauthorized Practice of Law, the New York State Bar 
Association, and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
(ABCNY).139 
 
participation, then lawyering, like all other occupations, becomes a significant part of 
the political order. See Rana, supra note 36, at 1670. 
 132. See Julius Cohen, 77, Lawyer 53 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1950, at 12. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
 135. A Talk with Julius H. Cohen, Minimizer of Controversy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Jan. 26, 1913, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res= 
F10B1EFE385F13738DDDAF0A94D9405B838DF1D3. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See COHEN, supra note 19. 
 139. Julius Cohen, 77, Lawyer 53 Years, supra note 132; see also POWELL, supra 
note 75, at 40–41.  Cohen is perhaps best remembered for his work in support of the 
Federal Arbitration Act. See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New 
Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926).  In some ways, his effort to bring 
peaceful resolution to commercial and labor disputes mirrors his efforts within the 
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Cohen grew up at a time when anti-Semitism was mounting.140  The 
economic recessions and accompanying class conflict of the 1890s, 
which were hitting just as he entered college and intensifying as he 
graduated, exacerbated an already tense and deeply ambivalent 
attitude toward Jews in America.141  The American legal profession 
was far from immune from the general attitude toward Jews.  The 
elite of the bar kept Jewish professionals at a safe distance, allowing 
some to play in their ranks but never fully opening the doors to 
them.142  President Wilson nominated Louis Brandeis to the Supreme 
Court in January 1916, the same year that Cohen published his 
book.143  The controversy over Brandeis’s nomination focused on his 
alleged radical positions, but historians and biographers have agreed 
that much of the resistance from the established bar was a product of 
anti-Semitism.144 
These underlying issues remain at a safe distance in Cohen’s book 
on the legal profession.  His experiences with discrimination, which 
were no doubt immediate, do not figure in.  Cohen used the rhetoric 
of the professions to promote a meritocracy open to all who could 
meet its requirements.145  The elitism of inherited privilege gave way 
in Cohen’s reading to privilege based on intelligence, hard work, and 
character.146 
 
profession to minimize the permanence and intractability of difference.  For a history 
of arbitration in America, see generally IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: 
REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992). 
 140. See John Higham, Anti-Semitism in the Gilded Age: A Reinterpretation, 43 
MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 559, 563–66 (1957). 
 141. See id. at 564–65.  More recent historians have criticized what they perceive as 
the post-war generation of historians downplaying anti-Semitism as an endemic part 
of American society and culture. See MICHAEL N. DOBKOWSKI, THE TARNISHED 
DREAM: THE BASIS OF AMERICAN ANTI-SEMITISM 3–7 (1979).  Dobkowski 
particularly takes issue with attributing the cause of anti-Semitism to economic 
forces.  But ultimately, historians seem to agree that hatred and bigotry against Jews 
rose throughout the Gilded Age.  While it may have ebbed and flowed, as Higham 
argues, it undoubtedly mounted as the thirties approached. See Higham, supra note 
140, at 571. 
 142. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 70–73. 
 143. See Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People’s 
Lawyer, 105 YALE L. J. 1445, 1447–49 (1996). 
 144. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 71. 
 145. See COHEN, supra note 19, at xv (arguing that the law has a value to society 
and ought to be limited to those who are “specially trained and qualified”); id. at 1–
23 (discussing disbarment of lawyers who do not possess the proper moral and 
intellectual qualities). 
 146. See id. 
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In 1916, Julius Henry Cohen published a book called The Law: 
Business or Profession?  This book offers insight into the role 
professionalism played in its early years in America and helps answer 
what place it ought to have now.  At the turn of the twentieth century, 
professionalism offered newcomers of all sorts an imagined avenue 
not only to material advancement but also to a true sense of 
belonging and leadership.147  It offered at least the promise and 
possibility of citizenship in the traditional republican sense of the 
word.  Professionalism not only offered the hope of belonging and 
partaking of the country’s riches but also held out the promise that a 
recent immigrant or someone lingering for whatever reason on the 
fringe could, through hard work and determination, contribute to 
society.  In so doing, that person could earn true membership in its 
ranks.  The professions still hold out hope in the form of that 
particular version of the American Dream. 
Julius Henry Cohen argued against a growing sense that business 
clients had rendered the idea of a separate legal profession 
obsolete.148  In a familiar republican lament, he decried the decline of 
the professional ideal only to argue for the ultimate need and 
potential for its redemption.149  He cataloged the disarray, the abuses, 
and the degeneration of professionalism just as he defended it as a 
cornerstone of modern democracy.150  But professionalism itself 
comprehends that rhetoric of decline and regeneration.  Lawyers, for 
instance, are always at once the source of the problem and the 
solution. 
Cohen used professionalism to recreate the liberal values that 
seemed subtly threatened by his own experience and by the social 
 
 147. See id. at 31–32 (arguing that the legal profession is necessary to solve 
society’s “stupendous” problems and promote “the harmony and coordination of its 
parts, its convenience, its permanency, and its facility”); id. at 318 (arguing that 
lawyers are responsible for truth and justice in society because “the administration of 
the law is Justice itself”). 
 148. See id. at xiii–xviii, 271 (noting that the relationship between a lawyer and a 
client ought not to be commodified). 
 149. See id. at 309–15. 
 150. It was not uncommon at the time to think of history as cyclical.  Evolution and 
Social Darwinian theories led many historians and social critics to conclude that 
history itself follows the pattern of birth, decay, and death.  Progressives often added 
regeneration to the list, envisioning a positive and optimistic progression toward a 
better world as the old order died, while the best and strongest aspects survived 
spawning a new culture in its wake. See PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE 
“OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 92–100 
(1988); STOW PERSONS, AMERICAN MINDS: A HISTORY OF IDEAS 227–28 (1958). 
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realty in turn-of-the-century New York.151  By promoting 
professionalism, Cohen attempted to create an Enlightenment world 
(or at least a fantasy of one) in which social and moral progress would 
emerge through science, education, and hard work.152  The only place 
to find all three of these values, he argued, was in the professions in 
general and the legal profession in particular.153  Cohen infused this 
notion of progress through professional advancement with a moral 
component, insisting that the legal profession was a receptacle for 
morality and integrity and the only possible source of its perpetuation 
in a world that was becoming increasingly secular, anonymous, and 
ruthless.154  Professionalism allowed Cohen to envision harmony 
 
 151. For a description of the cultural dislocation in turn-of-the-century America, 
see generally T.J. JACKSON LEARS, NO PLACE OF GRACE: ANTI-MODERNISM AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE (1880–1920) (1981). See also RICHARD 
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R (1955); WIEBE, supra 
note 8. 
 152. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 316–17 (“We must permit freedom of access to 
the Bar, but this freedom of access must be conditioned upon adequate moral and 
professional training.  The schools of law must be open to all men, but the ‘door of 
admission to the Bar must swing on reluctant hinges, and only he be permitted to 
pass through who has by continued and patient study fitted himself for the work of a 
safe counselor and the place of a leader.’”). 
 153. See id. 
 154. H. Stuart Hughes argued that this period in European intellectual thought 
marked a clear revolt against the Positivism of the previous century.  While Cohen, 
unlike the European thinkers Hughes analyzed, was not expounding a theory of 
social integration, he too managed to mix a reverence for science and reason with a 
role for morality and free will. See H. STUART HUGHES, CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
SOCIETY: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 1890–1930, at 33–
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MARSHALL BERMAN, ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR: THE EXPERIENCE OF 
MODERNITY (1982); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 
(1990).  T.J. Jackson Lears has argued that America in the early twentieth century 
embraced a kind of anti-modernism in which people sought the intensity and release 
that was absent in the capitalist world that demanded perpetual psychological self-
control. See LEARS, supra note 151, at 47–58.  Professionalism fits into Lears’s thesis.  
It, too, provided an antidote to the banality of the secular world by importing a 
language of religious devotion and intense dedication to a worldly pursuit.  Other 
historians have tracked the specific changes in America that accompanied 
immigration, industrialization, and urbanization at the turn of the nineteenth century 
and argued about the culture’s response to these phenomena. See HOFSTADTER, 
supra note 151, at 323–30; GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A 
REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900–1916 (1963); WIEBE, supra note 8, 
at 164–95; John D. Buenker, The Progressive Era: A Search for a Synthesis, 51 MID-
AMERICA 175 (1969); Samuel P. Hays, The Politics of Reform in Municipal 
Government in the Progressive Era, 55 PAC. NW. Q. 157, 157–59 (1964); David P. 
Thelen, Social Tensions and the Origins of Progressivism, 56 J. AM. HIST. 323, 335–41 
(1969).  For a summary of this debate, see Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of 
Progressivism, 10 REVS. AM. HIST. 113 (1982). 
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between individual rights and social order just as the strain between 
the two seemed so glaringly apparent in his own life and experience. 
Perhaps most importantly, without drawing attention to it, Cohen 
promoted professionalism to preserve his own tenuous route to 
assimilation.155  As historians have explained, the professions 
provided a road, albeit an imperfect one, to middle class life for the 
children of immigrants and ethnic minorities.156  By supplying avenues 
of advancement, professions like law and medicine to some limited 
extent provided access to the ‘good life’ in America.157  But in reality 
the professions were saturated with prejudice and, in the early 
twentieth century, the top echelon of the bar remained out of reach 
for most immigrants.158  As a system of thought, professionalism made 
good on the promise.  In other words, the rhetoric of the professions 
offered a route to leadership to all, regardless of race or ethnicity.159  
The rhetoric of professionalism suggested that anyone could eradicate 
difference and cloak him or herself in an identity that was both 
American and at least on the surface agnostic as to ethnic, religious, 
or racial identity.  According to the rhetoric, professionals were 
stripped of personal characteristics.  They were bastions of expertise 
and, ideally, virtue.  As a Jew, Cohen could imagine and promote a 
route to citizenship, which, in theory, avoided all the practical 
obstacles that he faced in his real struggle to succeed in American life.  
In a way, professionalism was as significant to Julius Henry Cohen’s 
success as his practical achievements as a lawyer.160 
The educational requirements that Cohen defended so vigorously 
served a purpose other than just monopoly restrictions on entrance to 
the profession.  In Cohen’s imagination, education provided the key 
to assimilation.161  It was this process of learning that erased the 
particularity of one’s immigrant background and allowed one to 
assume a new distinctly professional (and American) identity.  It was 
education that replaced the insular culture of the inner city ghetto 
 
 155. He does not say so explicitly.  Nor does he even mention his religion 
anywhere in his book, but his emphasis on moral and intellectual worth, hard work, 
and education are all tacit justifications for his own ascent within the profession. 
 156. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 457–505. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. at 459–60. 
 159. COHEN, supra note 19, at xiii–xviii, 316–17. 
 160. For a discussion of the barriers to women, blacks, and Jews in the profession, 
see FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 29–33. 
 161. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 125–41 (arguing that law schools were essential 
for building character and training students to become good lawyers). 
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with a new set of mores designed for a new community.  In Cohen’s 
imagination, the three-year law school provided the fire that would 
ultimately fuel the melting pot.162  Without education, the immigrant 
was thrown into the law with his particular, parochial, old-world ethic 
intact—a recipe, according to Cohen, for corruption and the 
disintegration of professional values.163 
While it seems somehow silly and naïve from our vantage point to 
suppose that entrance into the legal profession offered the key to 
social acceptance in 1914, Cohen used professionalism to help create 
the reality that was just out of his reach.164  Cohen used the rhetoric of 
professionalism, its decline, and its rebirth to argue not only that 
immigrants and minorities could access American culture, but also to 
suggest subtly that immigrants possessed a unique ability to 
contribute to the professions because of their identity as outsiders.165  
Their erstwhile place on the periphery suited them to serve as 
mediators between the needs of individuals and the dictates of the 
law.  The immigrant could earn his membership in society through 
education, but he would never be absorbed completely.  He would 
never lose his ability to critique the law from the outside, providing 
that extra check, that extra balance that Alexis de Tocqueville always 
imagined as part of the role of American lawyers.166 
In the 1920s, Cohen argued for a unified state bar association, 
insisting that the selective admission based on ethnicity undermined 
professional ideals.167  He argued that while there were forty women 
lawyers at the annual NYCLA dinner: 
The daughter of a distinguished lawyer, fired by ambition to follow 
in his footsteps, might win the highest honors in her college, come 
out at the head of her class in the law school, be the first in the list of 
those admitted by the Appellate Division, overwhelmingly 
demonstrate her character and fitness to the appropriate committee, 
engage in the practice of law and at once win esteem and 
confidence, yet she could knock at the doors of the city bar 
 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 167. See POWELL, supra note 75, at 41. 
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association until the skin fell from her knuckles and the door-keeper 
would keep her out.168 
Despite his advocacy for inclusion, Cohen did not want to open the 
doors of the profession to all.169  He fought to replace the superficial 
characteristics of inherited privilege with merit.170  Cohen led the 
movement for a unified bar.171  He argued against discrimination but 
he was certainly not a modern day Jacksonian, arguing to dismantle 
professional privilege and make the law accessible to all.172  It is 
particularly significant that in arguing for a unified bar, Cohen did not 
use the example of his own ethnicity and religion.  He used a different 
marginalized group instead.173  As Samuel Levine has noted, Cohen’s 
own relationship to Judaism is not particularly clear.174  There are 
shreds of evidence that he may have left his religion behind for a 
more secular existence.175  But he did not abandon his background 
exactly.  The idea of the professions as a route from the periphery to 
the center for those with intelligence, dedication, and character must 
have been formed by his experience as a Jew in America.  Nor did he 
completely shed his experience as an outsider as he worked to reform 
the profession from within. 
Cohen published his book, The Law: Business, or Profession?, two 
years after Louis Brandeis published his collection of essays with a 
very similar title, Business—A Profession.176  Perhaps this is a 
coincidence.  But maybe not.  Brandeis argued, in a speech with the 
same name as his book, that business had become a profession.  
Cohen would not go so far.  He certainly agreed with Brandeis that 
business had assumed many of the traits of a profession and that 
many businessmen conducted their affairs with a thoughtful eye to 
 
 168. See POWELL, supra note 75, at 43 (quoting Julius H. Cohen, The National Call 
for the Organization of an All Inclusive Bar, 4 N.Y. L. REV. 95 (1926)); see also Julius 
H. Cohen, An Address at the Annual Banquet of the Rhode Island Bar Association 
(Jan. 15, 1926). 
 169. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 316–17. 
 170. See id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Julius Henry Cohen, Address, The Community’s Interest in High 
Standards of Qualification for Admission to the Bar, in REPORT OF THE TWENTY-
NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 157, 165 
(1924). 
 173. See Levine, supra note 20, at 10–12. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See id. 
 176. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 1–12 (1914). 
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the good of all.177  But there is something in his book, an answer to 
Brandeis, in a way, suggesting that the legal profession would always 
have a greater role than business in preserving the good of society. 
Cohen began his book by cataloguing disciplinary cases.178  He 
sought to convince his reader that the courts and the bar were busy 
policing the ranks of lawyers, discarding those who were unfit and 
preserving the dignity of the profession.  For the most part, the 
miscreant lawyers were nameless.179  With a few notable exceptions, 
they lacked attributes.  They could have been Jewish, Italian, 
Catholic, women, or Protestants.  The reader is left to guess by the 
names in the footnotes.180  This must have been intentional.  By 
omitting personal characteristics, the only thing we know is that these 
lawyers were bad.  They harmed their clients, the public, and the 
reputation of the profession.  That, alone, warrants exclusion.  Cohen 
capitulated in the restrictive policies of the bar, but by stripping these 
lawyers of their racial or ethnic identity, he disassociated these sorts 
of rules from animus against certain groups of newcomers entering 
the profession. 
Cohen mentioned one case in which the court suspended a lawyer’s 
license because he falsely claimed on behalf of his wealthy corporate 
client that a conversation was privileged.181  Here, Cohen’s egalitarian 
strand gained the pen.  The lawyer, it seems, claimed that his acts 
were justified because his powerful client brought wealth to society.182  
As such, he argued, his client should have been shielded from 
liability.  Society deserved protection from plaintiffs seeking to suck 
its resources dry.  Cohen quoted the court’s admonition: 
If the profession is to have the respect of the community; if it is to be 
trusted by courts and by others who have to do with the 
administration of justice, its members must realize that a crime is a 
crime whosoever commits it . . . .  [N]either his wealth nor 
prominence will protect a lawyer in going outside of his professional 
obligations to shield him from the consequences of his acts.183 
The threat to the legal profession, in other words, comes from all 
ranks—the elite representing the most prestigious clients and the 
 
 177. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 40–41. 
 178. See id. at 1–23. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. at 16–17. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. at 17. 
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rank and file whose clients are powerless and poor.  It is not race, 
ethnicity, wealth, or status that determine worth in the world of 
professionalism, but rather intelligence and character, two things that 
were distributed equally throughout the growingly segmented 
profession. 
Cohen devoted much of his time to battling the unauthorized 
practice of law.184  He served on bar committees dedicated to studying 
and eliminating the problem of the unauthorized practice of law.185  
Cohen consistently argued that laymen—notaries and corporations 
particularly—could not protect clients adequately.186  The public 
suffered as the court invalidated wills and deeds created by 
individuals with no experience in the law.187  Of course, as many 
historians have noted this self-serving rhetoric masked the self-
interest of the profession.188  Lawyers could keep prices high by 
eliminating competition.189  While serving as the chairman of a 
committee fighting the unauthorized practice of law, Cohen admitted 
that many notaries guilty of violating the rules were foreign born.190  
But in the same breath, he explained that in many countries other 
than the United States, notaries were educated and qualified to draft 
wills and deeds.191  In a gesture unnecessary to his central argument, 
Cohen excused the immigrants as ignorant rather than malicious or 
greedy. 
As historians like Auerbach have argued, professionalism may 
have been used to exclude immigrants and establish a kind of 
professional aristocracy.192  But at the same time, the rhetoric 
contained the seeds for the extinction of this sort of inherited 
 
 184. See A Talk with Julius H. Cohen, Minimizer of Controversy, supra note 135; 
see also, e.g., Julius Henry Cohen, Address, The Unlawful Practice of Law, in 
CALIFORNIA BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS THIRTEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 
66–88 (1922); Julius H. Cohen, Unlawful Practice of the Law Must Be Prevented, 101 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 44, 44–48 (1922); Julius H. Cohen, Lay Practice 
of Law Injures Clients, Not the Legal Profession, 5 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 52, 52–53 (1921–
22); Julius Henry Cohen, Unlawful Practice of the Law by Laymen and Corporations, 
22 LAW STUD. HELPER 12, 12–15 (1914) [hereinafter Cohen, Laymen and 
Corporations]. 
 185. See Cohen, Laymen and Corporations, supra note 184, at 12–13. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. at 12. 
 188. See ABEL, supra note 41, at 112–13; AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 74–129. 
 189. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Cohen, Laymen and Corporations, supra note 184, at 12. 
 191. See id. 
 192. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 4–13. 
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privilege.  And Cohen—a newcomer who had managed to make his 
way in—emphasized this alternate aspect of professionalism.  
Quoting an appellate court opinion, Cohen insisted that 
The practice of law is not a business open to all . . . but a personal 
right, limited to a few persons of good moral character . . . with 
special qualifications ascertained and certified after a long course of 
study, both general and professional, and a thorough examination by 
a state board appointed for the purpose. . . .  The right to practice 
law is in the nature of a franchise from the state conferred only for 
merit.  It cannot be assigned or inherited but must be earned by hard 
study and good conduct.193 
As he progressed in his career, Cohen grew more explicit in his 
understanding of the professions as a guaranteed path to success for 
worthy immigrants.  In an address at the Maryland State Bar 
Association in 1924, Cohen affirmatively stated that the profession 
must remain open to all.194  He began by defending the profession in a 
way that even then must have seemed familiar.  The profession, 
unlike most obligations, is noble because its members serve a greater 
good.195  There are rules and principles, which dictate that the lawyer 
must pursue something beyond his own self-interest.196  Cohen 
insisted that this public function was more important than that of 
other professions.197  “Society,” he claimed, “cannot exist without 
law.”198  Lawyers created the fabric of the community.199  He 
emphasized that lawyers, unlike judges, have obligations to both the 
law and to individuals.200  It is precisely this position on the border, he 
argued, that guarantees liberty.201   
Cohen then reasoned that in order to perform this function, the bar 
must select people who are both knowledgeable and virtuous.202  The 
only way to do so was through strict entry requirements.203  He 
concluded by discussing why the British system cannot suffice.204  He 
 
 193. COHEN, supra note 19, at 247–48. 
 194. See Cohen, supra note 172, at 158–66. 
 195. See id. at 159. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See id. at 158–60. 
 198. Id. at 160. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. at 160–61. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See id. at 164. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See id. at 165. 
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wrote, “[b]ecause of the very important functions the bar performs, 
the people of our country do not want an aristocratic bar, they want a 
democratic bar.  They want a bar of made up [sic] men who come 
from all parts of the country and from all classes.”205  Cohen then 
directly addressed the question of how America could sustain a 
democratic bar that serves such a critical function: 
It means that the bar shall be open to everyone, no matter where he 
comes from, no matter where he was born, no matter what his race 
or religion is, that the opportunities for education shall be so broad 
that every man of capacity can acquire the necessary education to fit 
himself for admission to the bar.206 
Cohen, who was generally a fairly content member of a legal elite, 
which at the time sought to eliminate night schools, went on to defend 
part-time legal education as fundamental to the professional 
mission.207  He concluded,  
It is possible in America to have a democratic bar responsive to the 
general sentiment of the country so that those who have in their 
hands the great power of administering justice shall come from all 
sections of the country, all sections of the people, and yet at the 
same time to insist upon the very highest standards of moral 
qualifications for admission to the bar.208   
Cohen used the rhetoric of the professions to argue that outsiders and 
immigrants could become not only acceptable members of the 
profession, but moreover critical ones.  They connected the bar to a 
constantly changing democratic spirit while simultaneously 
controlling the meaning and interpretation of the country’s laws. 
His faith in the educational system to instill knowledge and virtue, 
reward merit, and provide equal opportunities to all certainly seems 
outdated.  But the hope for a meritocracy, for a way to create 
something akin to democratic access through education, is not dead 
yet.  Like the professional ideal itself, this aspect of the 
Enlightenment project is useful to retain as a (perhaps unattainable) 
goal. 
 
 205. Id. 
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III.  BEYOND THE MULTICULTURALISM-ASSIMILATION DIVIDE 
Cohen’s optimism, his ability to embrace professionalism as a 
source of transformation, in which the particularities of one’s 
background melted away, may have thrived on a different zeitgeist.  
Nativism, at the turn of the century, had a different tone than it does 
today.  At the risk of glorifying a rather troubled time in our past, 
even most xenophobes had a relatively welcoming attitude toward 
foreigners and minorities for a time.209  Americans, for the most part, 
had not yet fully embraced a fixed notion of race and identity.210  The 
nativism of the early 1900s largely shared the optimistic tone of its 
era.  While decrying the poor hygiene and moral depravity of 
immigrant populations, most reformers had faith in the nation’s 
power to transform the masses and rehabilitate them in its image.211  
They believed that America’s unique wonder was not its Anglo-
Saxon race, exactly, but rather the national spirit most nobly 
embodied in that race.212  So reformers—temperance societies, social 
workers, and women’s groups, to name a few—confidently paraded 
into the inner city slums with the intent to convert the newest 
members to America’s code of conduct.213  As historians have 
repeatedly argued, this agenda was fueled by paternalistic 
assumptions about the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon way of life.214  
Progressive reformers were ignorant about the value of other cultures 
and their unique contributions to the communities in which they now 
lived.215  Furthermore, scholars have argued, the effort to convert 
immigrants to “American” values was in some ways even more 
insidious than overt hatred and exclusion.216  And that is true—in a 
way.  But the idea of the melting pot did offer a theoretical place to 
newcomers who were willing to work hard to relinquish the old ways 
 
 209. See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
NATIVISM, 1860–1925, at 106–23 (1955). 
 210. See id. 
 211. See id. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See id. at 119–22. 
 214. For a historiography of the settlement movement, see ALLEN F. DAVIS, 
SPEARHEADS FOR REFORM: THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENTS AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
MOVEMENT, 1880–1914, at xvii–xxiv (1984). 
 215. HIGHAM, supra note 209, at 119–22. 
 216. See generally RUTH BORDIN, WOMEN AND TEMPERANCE: THE QUEST FOR 
POWER AND LIBERTY, 1873–1900 (1981); PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL 
REFORM IN AMERICA, 1890–1920 (1992); DAVIS, supra note 214; ELLEN FITZPATRICK, 
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and fuse with the new culture.  It offered a way to imagine success in 
the new country.217 
The melting pot ideal, with all its arrogance and condescension, is 
not something we should to strive to replicate.  How then is the story 
of Cohen and the perspective it lends to professionalism relevant?  To 
understand if and how Cohen’s version of professionalism can fit into 
a modern dialog, it is useful to explore how theories of integration, 
Americanization, and cultural differences have evolved.  Cohen used 
professionalism to create a route to assimilation.218  He imagined a 
world in which differences faded as professionals shared a language of 
expertise with a community that had proved commitment, 
intelligence, and moral worth.219  But the particularities of Cohen’s 
life, his ethnic origin, and his past made their way back in and shaped 
his understanding of the professions.  Our attitude toward cultural 
difference has changed since Cohen’s time, but his understanding and 
use of professionalism is still relevant and worth preserving. 
The rhetoric of the melting pot, born in Julius Henry Cohen’s day 
and made popular in the 1950s, has gone out of style.220  Historians, 
political theorists, and sociologists have all pointed out how the 
assimilation ideal masked racism, xenophobia, and cultural 
imperialism.221  The middle class reformers of the Progressive Era 
who sought to assimilate the newcomers to America condescendingly 
 
 217. In 1911, Franz Boas, perhaps the most well-known anthropologist of the time, 
published a report on immigration designed to prove that immigrants’ traits were 
evolving to suit the new American environment. Franz Boas, Introductory, in 
REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION: CHANGES IN BODILY FORM OF 
DESCENDENTS OF IMMIGRANTS, S. DOC. NO. 208, at 1–3 (2d Sess. 1911).  As John 
Higham has argued, Boas essentially devoted his academic life to proving that 
immigrants and ethnic minorities would shed bad traits and meld into American 
society. See HIGHAM, supra note 174, at 125.  It is not a coincidence that this theory 
of racial dissolution should come from Boas, who was himself a Jewish immigrant 
from Germany.  Boas was, in his own work, describing a process by which the 
attributes that separated him from the mainstream would disappear.  He was writing 
just as the influx of Eastern European Jews seemed to threaten the German Jewish 
ascent, which made Boas’s theory even more critical. 
 218. See supra Part II.  
 219. See COHEN, supra note 19, at xv, 1–23. 
 220. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
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rights. See id. at 2–3. 
 221. See id. at 14. 
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hoped to teach them hygiene, morality, and manners.222  They hoped, 
in other words, to impose the language and customs of the majority 
on immigrant groups.  Recently, historians have argued that between 
the wars, some reformers were more sensitive to cultural difference.223  
Their effort to assimilate immigrants included a celebration of the 
cultural gifts that each different group could bring to the whole.224  
This “cultural gifts movement” was limited in its approach to 
socioeconomic difference and the entrenched and complicated nature 
of prejudice but its proponents did recognize the value that diversity 
could bring to education and civic life.225 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the assimilation ideal reached a new 
level of popularity.  After World War II, historians, public 
intellectuals, and the media sought to minimize difference and to 
celebrate a uniquely American spirit, a kind of Anglo-Saxon 
essence.226  But the rise of identity politics in the 1960s put an end to 
the focus on assimilation.227  The Vietnam War and the social unrest 
that accompanied it undermined the faith in a benevolent Anglo-
Saxon spirit.  Historians and cultural critics began to celebrate 
separate immigrant cultures just as popular social movements 
promoted diverse racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual identities.228 
In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars of international law, political 
theory, and philosophy promoted multiculturalism.  Proponents of 
multiculturalism, unlike the champions of assimilation, acknowledged 
and celebrated difference.229  Assimilationists hoped to impose the 
language and customs of the majority on immigrant groups.230  Critical 
of this approach, scholars of international law, political theory, and 
philosophy promoted multiculturalism in its stead.231 
 
 222. See HIGHAM, supra note 209, at 119–22. 
 223. See DIANA SELIG, AMERICANS ALL: THE CULTURAL GIFTS MOVEMENT 2 
(2008). 
 224. See id. 
 225. See id. 
 226. KYMLICKA, supra note 220, at 14. See generally OSCAR HANDLIN, THE 
UPROOTED: THE EPIC STORY OF THE GREAT MIGRATION THAT MADE THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE (1951). 
 227. KYMLICKA, supra note 220, at 61–69. 
 228. See HERBERT G. GUTMAN, WORK, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY IN 
INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA (1976) (arguing that immigrants maintained their own 
ethnic identities). 
 229. See KYMLICKA, supra note 220, at 11, 14. 
 230. See id. 
 231. See id. 
ROIPHE_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:44 PM 
2012] ROUTE TO CITIZENSHIP 65 
Multiculturalism, unlike assimilation, acknowledges and celebrates 
difference.  In America, multiculturalism was born mostly as an 
educational movement, a movement that encouraged schools to teach 
students to celebrate difference and embrace diverse cultures rather 
than allowing the majority to displace and denigrate them.232  So in 
the 1970s, Stanford invested in residential houses based on ethnic and 
racial difference,233 the Supreme Court celebrated diversity as a 
compelling state interest,234 and private grade schools sought to 
increase the racial and ethnic diversity of their student bodies.235  
Almost immediately, however, multiculturalism came under attack.  
According to one critique, multiculturalism breeds distrust.236  It 
divides and atomizes rather than unites.237  We inevitably lose the 
chance of civic membership of a robust, or really any, sense of the 
public good as we all retreat to enclaves defined by our ethnicity, 
race, gender, or sexual orientation.238 
Some political theorists have further claimed that multiculturalism 
is inconsistent with liberalism.239  How could a liberal democracy 
tolerate and even celebrate groups that deny rights to its members?  
Certainly, if one were to import multiculturalism from the 
educational context to the polity, it would be hard for a liberal state 
to tolerate and encourage groups that routinely discriminated against 
or abused certain members of that group.  Liberalism and 
multiculturalism may not be mutually exclusive, but there are strange 
tensions and hypocrisies.  One problem with multiculturalism is that 
by protecting minority communities, we can inadvertently endorse 
the mistreatment of some within that community.  For example, 
 
 232. See Richard Rorty, The Demonization of Multiculturalism, 7 J. BLACKS 
HIGHER EDUC. 74, 74 (1995). 
 233. See Madhavi Devasher, Campus Defends Its Ethnic Theme Houses, 
STANFORD DAILY, Nov. 19, 2002. 
 234. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 279 (1977); see also 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 321–24 (2003). 
 235. See Devasher, supra note 233. 
 236. See Amy Gutmann, Introduction to MULTICULTURALISM AND “THE POLITICS 
OF RECOGNITION” 3, 18–21 (1992). 
 237. See id. 
 238. Historian and legal scholar Reva Siegel has argued recently that the “swing” 
justices on the Supreme Court have begun to recognize this problem (which she 
labels “balkanization”) and integrate it into their decisions concerning affirmative 
action. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging 
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L. J. 1278, 1280–1303 (2011). 
 239. See BRIAN BARRY, THE CULTURE OF EQUALITY 163 (2001). 
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scholars have argued that many ethnic groups treat women poorly.240  
By demonstrating respect, tolerance, and approval of these insular 
communities, a multicultural state risks inadvertently legitimizing 
these destructive sorts of hierarchies.241   
Recently, political theorists have addressed this tension by trying to 
reconcile multiculturalism with liberalism.  Bhikhu Parekh, for 
instance, has argued that we have to nurture diversity but also 
encourage a sense of belonging to the state as a whole.242  The state 
should encourage and protect cultural rights, which allow individuals 
and groups to cherish and perpetuate their cultural identity.243  But as 
a community, we must balance the claims of groups against the rights 
of individual members of those groups.244  A multicultural state 
cannot ignore that we all live in a community and we must foster a 
sense of responsibility and commonality among all groups and 
individuals.245  Parekh celebrates difference but also recognizes the 
importance of a shared community with a robust sense of values and 
the common good.246  He promotes a political and legal world that 
would recognize both.247  That is a tall order, to say the least. 
To make this work, we need to understand the complex interaction 
between individuals and the various groups to which they belong.  
 
 240. See Ayelet Shachar, Group Identity and Women’s Rights in Family Law: The 
Perils of Multicultural Accommodation, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 285, 285–91 (1998).  Shachar 
gives the example of Israeli courts accommodating Rabbinical courts and Halakhic 
law.  Halakhic law gives husbands the sole right to determine whether or not to 
divorce.  By accommodating this law in a multicultural fashion, Israel does more than 
just accommodate the religious group, it tacitly accepts the domination of women 
within that group. See id. at 291. 
 241. See id. at 288; see also AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: 
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 17 (2001).  In addition, 
multiculturalism in America produced a kind of intellectual tyranny from the left that 
rivaled the consensus patriotism that preceded it on the right.  Prone to excess, some 
proponents of multiculturalism insisted that only certain forms of scholarship and 
certain sorts of statements were valid.  They refused to listen to dissent and stifled 
conversation by ostracizing anyone whose thoughts strayed from the party line.  Of 
course, this intolerance is not inherent to the idea of multiculturalism but did seem to 
accompany it into public debate. 
 242. See BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL THEORY 342 (2000). 
 243. See id. at 341. 
 244. See id. 
 245. See id.  Parekh advocates a dialogue between cultures and the “ethical norms, 
principles and institutional structures presupposed and generated by [those 
cultures].” Id. at 14. 
 246. See id. at 341. 
 247. See id. 
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Charles Taylor, a renowned professor of political philosophy, has 
pointed out that identity is not fixed.248  People develop an idea of 
self, which is perpetually created and recreated in a symbiotic 
relationship with collective identity.249  Taylor rejects the idea that the 
public space ought to be devoid of particularity, characterized only by 
republican political culture.250  He dismisses the liberal conception of 
a public sphere that erases individual difference.251  Instead, each 
different culture should preserve its authenticity while simultaneously 
participating in a public conversation.252  Charles Taylor moves the 
debate away from respect for different ethnicities and cultures to the 
idea of a nation built on cultural difference.253  He argues that over 
the course of the last two centuries, nationalism has moved from a 
sense of legal rights to ethnic culture.254  In other words, according to 
Taylor, we are unified not by geography, political contract, or nation 
states, but rather by ethnic ties.255 
Taylor’s work helps to conceptualize the problem, but no one has 
quite solved how to balance the concerns over balkanization with the 
need to respect difference.  This is where professionalism can play a 
critical part.  As Emile Durkheim argued, the professions have a role 
to play in resolving these tensions.256  The professions do hold out the 
(still viable) hope of inclusion and participation, as they did for Julius 
Henry Cohen.257  It is not just that education and the professions offer 
hope to a bunch of immigrants sitting with their faces pressed up 
against the window of privilege.  It is also that the legal profession 
 
 248. See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM AND 
“THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION” 25, 31–37 (1992). 
 249. See id. at 31; see also MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF 
JUSTICE 150–65 (1982) (articulating a communitarian philosophy based on the notion 
that individuals are critically formed by groups like churches, neighborhoods, family, 
and unions).  Kymlicka agrees that identity is formed by subnational groups, but he 
believes that the values of these individuals and groups can be reworked and revised 
in dialogue with others. See KYMLICKA, supra note 220, at 92–93. 
 250. See Taylor, supra note 248, at 37–51. 
 251. See id. 
 252. See id. at 31–37. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See id. at 28–30. 
 255. See id. at 56–61. 
 256. In wrenching professionalism from the clutches of its critics, I am also in some 
ways relying on the functionalist analysis that has long gone out of style. See Parker 
& Rostain, supra note 11, at 2362.  I am obviously not trying to do so in a way that 
ignores the important critiques that followed, but rather, acknowledging some limited 
but critical worth to the functionalist argument. 
 257. See supra notes 155–60 and accompanying text. 
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offers the promise of civic participation, a kind of participation that 
allows newcomers not just to belong but also to shape the rules that 
constitute the community.  Those rules then will reflect not just a 
blanched out version of their creators, but rather a complex 
professional identity that is created through interaction with all the 
groups to which each individual belongs.  This should include racial, 
ethnic, religious, civic, gender political, and professional groups, to 
name just a few.  
In order to capture both cultural specificity and unity, we need an 
arena in which the particulars of ethnic and racial identity dissolve 
momentarily only to be reconstituted.258  It is a limited melting pot, 
one in which the ingredients reemerge magically after altering the 
nature of the mix.259  The expertise and daily occupation of 
professionals provides a common language, a shared goal, of sorts.  
The rules of professional ethics and the norms of the courtroom 
supply a professional identity.  The traditional account of lawyers’ 
ethics insists that this source of identity should replace all others.  In 
Sanford Levinson’s terms, lawyers must assume a “bleach[ed] out” 
professionalism.260  But this account is not only undesirable, it is also 
unrealistic.  Just as Julius Henry Cohen brought his own particular 
circumstances to bear on his work within the profession, so too 
inevitably will all professionals.261  To do so, however, professionals 
 
 258. In international law, Ruti Teitel and Iavor Rangelov have argued that 
resorting to courts to resolve conflict in a world that is increasingly plural is not 
necessarily de-politicizing.  They suggest that a global civil society can produce an 
arena “where legitimacy of justice claims and structures are produced, negotiated, 
and contested.” Ruti Teitel & Iavor Rangelov, Global Civil Society and Transitional 
Justice, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2011: GLOBALITY AND THE ABSENCE OF JUSTICE 
162, 176 (Martin Albrow & Hakan Seckinelgin eds., 2010).  I am essentially arguing 
that the legal profession itself can, and to some degree does, serve a similar purpose 
in America. 
 259. I am not arguing that the legal profession is the only possible source for this 
kind of meaningful participation.  I agree with Aziz Rana that all sorts of work can 
provide the opportunity for this sort of cultural translation. See Rana, supra note 36, 
at 1670, 1694–1700. 
 260. Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the 
Construction of Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1577 (1993). 
 261. At its most extreme, professionalism demands that its members relinquish 
their identity, dispense with their sense of morality, and embrace a new professional 
persona and a new set of ethical rules in their place. See generally Levinson, supra 
note 260.  David Wilkins has questioned the wisdom of this understanding of 
professionalism. See David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: 
Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030, 
1041 (1995) [hereinafter Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment] 
(suggesting that race ought to play a role in selecting clients); David Wilkins, 
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do have to adopt a professional identity, a miniature version of a 
public persona, but the interpretation of professional norms and 
values will constantly and invariably be defined by other aspects of 
the lawyer’s identity.  Of course, professionalism does not provide the 
entire answer to the dilemma that the need to balance respect for 
difference with a sense of unity and common purpose poses.  But it 
does offer one way to begin to muddle through.  As Durkheim 
argued, the professions in modern society can offer a bridge.262 
Much of the discussion about multiculturalism presumes an 
authentic self.  It assumes that one’s ethnic, racial, gender, or sexual 
identity forms that essential being and that everything else is 
masquerade.263  As a purely descriptive matter, that seems wrong.  
Lawyers can belong to more than one world, and it is not simply that 
the significance of belonging in an ethnic or racial group shapes their 
true self and their public or professional life requires them to blanch 
out that difference and assume a false identity to find a common 
interest with all.264  As sociologist Erving Goffman argued half a 
 
Straightjacketing Professionalism: A Comment on Russell, 95 MICH. L. REV. 795, 796 
(1997) [hereinafter Wilkins, Straighjacketing Professionalism] (arguing that the 
attorneys in the O.J. Simpson Case had obligations both as professionals and as 
African Americans).  Wilkins argues that black lawyers have responsibilities both as 
professionals and as members of their race.  They are constantly negotiating these 
two axes of their identity.  Thus, Wilkins explains: 
The legal profession’s “mainstream” norms carry moral, not just practical, 
weight.  They therefore constitute a legitimate constraint on how a black 
lawyer should respond to the fact that he or she is both representing race as 
well as representing clients. 
This does not mean that black lawyers must accept uncritically prevailing 
ethical practices.  Like other members of the profession, black lawyers have 
the right—and indeed the duty—to question the norms of “mainstream 
legal practice,” and to seek to change these prevailing understandings when 
they produce injustice.  As I argue elsewhere, African-American attorneys 
may have a particularly strong duty to seek change in cases where existing 
norms disadvantage the black community. 
Wilkins, Straitjacketing Professionalism, supra, at 800. This Article takes Wilkins’s 
argument one step further perhaps in arguing that race (or the particulars of one’s 
identity) inevitably plays a role in professional decision-making.  While I agree with 
Wilkins that this is both necessary and desirable, I am also suggesting that it is one of 
the ways in which the profession can and should translate the interests of groups into 
a language of expertise, which is accessible to all. 
 262. See DURKHEIM, supra note 92, at 10–14. 
 263. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL 
RIGHTS 22 (2006). 
 264. See Levinson, supra note 260, at 1601; Russell Pearce, White Lawyering: 
Rethinking Race, Lawyer Identity, and Rule of Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081, 2083 
(2005). 
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century ago, private life is shaped by the larger community and the 
larger community is shaped by ethnic identity.265  In other words, 
ethnic identity is not authentic and public persona is not artificial.  
The individual and group are, as Charles Taylor suggests, constantly 
defining one another.266 
The exchange, the movement back and forth, is facilitated by 
professional groups—groups that bridge the public and the private; 
groups that provide a common shared knowledge and expertise.  
Through shared language of expertise, professionals translate both 
for themselves and for others.  At least, it could be like that.  Julius 
Henry Cohen, for instance, took his own experience as an outsider 
and translated it into advocacy for part-time law schools and an 
inclusive bar.267  While he was not out fighting for civil rights, he was 
working in his daily life to make changes within the mainstream 
profession to accommodate and welcome outsiders.268  In doing so, he 
drew on and subtly changed the rhetoric of the professions. 
In his book, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights, 
Yale Professor and legal scholar Kenji Yoshino argues that the world 
(including the workplace) requires a sinister form of masquerade.269  
It requires that individuals play down qualities that make them 
different from others.  Drawing on Erving Goffman’s book on stigma, 
Yoshino claims that like Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who played 
down his disability, Americans feel the need to disguise their sexual, 
racial, or ethnic identities.270  So, he sums it up, “[w]e are at a 
transitional moment in how Americans discriminate. . . .  [I]ndividuals 
no longer need to be white, male, straight, Protestant, and able-
bodied; they need only to act white, male, straight, Protestant, and 
 
 265. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
(1959).  Goffman uses the imagery of a stage, arguing that each person chooses his or 
her stage, props, and costume.  The goal, it seems, is to maintain coherence, but 
coherence is not the same as authenticity.  The goal is not to preserve one true 
authentic self throughout all interactions but rather to find ways to crossover, to 
maintain a coherent but evolving sense of self despite the many different contexts in 
which we find ourselves. See id.  In a series of articles, Russell Pearce has reflected on 
the meaning of professional identity and its intersection with racial, religious, or 
ethnic identity. See Pearce, supra note 264, at 2089–99 (arguing that white lawyers 
should view themselves as having a racial identity to avoid establishing their own 
identity as the norm). 
 266. See Taylor, supra note 248, at 25, 34. 
 267. See supra notes 132–75 and accompanying text. 
 268. See id. 
 269. See YOSHINO, supra note 263, at 22. 
 270. See id. 
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able-bodied.”271  This, in a way, is the legacy of assimilation.  
Americans can invent themselves.  All boundaries are permeable.  
We can even shed the particularity of our racial, ethnic, or gender 
identities to merge into the mainstream.  But at what cost? 
Without disputing Yoshino’s contribution, it is possible to see this 
process as less sinister than he makes it out to be.  Of course, it would 
be bad if individuals were required consistently to repress 
characteristics of their sex, race, gender, or sexual orientation.  This 
demand is neither realistic, nor is it really being made.  People always 
choose to highlight certain qualities and mute others depending on 
the setting.  Even white men must blanch out certain personal 
characteristics in order to fold themselves into the workplace.  The 
professions, it seems, provide an opportunity to do so strategically.  
Cohen, for instance, seems to have muted his Jewish identity, but 
simultaneously translated it into an understanding of what the 
profession ought to be.272  He fought for equal access in a way that 
gave purpose to that aspect of his identity.  And of course, the 
profession has changed significantly as those on the periphery have 
made their way in.273 
CONCLUSION: RELEVANCE OF PROFESSIONALISM AS A ROUTE TO 
PARTICIPATION IN A POST-MULTICULTURAL STATE 
Of course, we live in a world very different from that of Julius 
Henry Cohen.  Among other things, the legal market has been 
changing at a rapid pace.274  The profession has been highly stratified 
 
 271. Id. 
 272. See Levine, supra note 20, at 3; see also Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First 
Amendment, supra note 261.  Wilkins argues that race can and should influence all 
sorts of decisions that one makes as a professional. Id. at 1041.  For example, in 
criticizing the black lawyer for representing the Klu Klux Klan, he argues that 
African-American lawyers’ experiences as a part of a racial minority ought to inform 
and alter the norms of the profession as a whole. See Wilkins, Straightjacketing 
Professionalism, supra note 261, at 800. 
 273. See Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1803, 1852–54 (2008). 
 274. See generally William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Law Job 
Stagnation May Have Started Before the Recession—and It May Be a Sign of 
Lasting Change, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
magazine/article/paradigm_shift/; John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, 
Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/03/05/science/05legal.html; Aric Press, A Chasm With Consequences, AM. LAW. 
(June 1, 2011), http://www.amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/06/chasm.html; 
Joel Stashenko, Lawyers Face New Challenges from Global Competition, N.Y. L.J., 
Feb. 4, 2011. 
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ever since Cohen was an active member of the bar.275  The diverse 
nature of the bar has always existed in an odd tension with the idea of 
a unified profession.  For years, the proliferation of different sorts of 
legal work and areas of expertise has posed a challenge to the ideal of 
a unified profession.276  Technology and globalization now threaten to 
render the concept obsolete.277  The opportunities in the law seem to 
be shutting down rather than expanding.278  Amidst these challenges, 
many call for the segmentation of law schools to track the growingly 
distinct realms of legal practice.279  Scholars like Brian Tamanaha 
suggest that the top ten law schools ought to continue as they are, 
teaching theory to an elite group who will use their grasp of 
jurisprudence to shape the laws of the country by practicing in 
prestigious law firms or government jobs.280  All the others, who study 
law at inferior institutions, ought be trained to serve individual clients 
and practice a trade.281  This education will be faster, cheaper, and 
more relevant.  Certainly, the argument goes, there is no place for 
theory, classes on jurisprudence, or the antiquated Socratic method at 
these lower ranked schools. 
Recently, legal scholar and sociologist Elizabeth Chambliss has 
criticized this call for the segmentation of law schools, arguing that it 
assumes that corporate clients need lawyers educated in history, 
theory, and philosophy, while average individual clients do not.282  It 
assumes that representing individuals is simple and requires relatively 
little understanding of how the law develops and changes.  It assumes 
that we should funnel all the best-credentialed students to corporate 
practice.  It assumes that corporate clients do not need lawyers with 
skills in counseling and human interaction.  All of these assumptions 
are unproved, if not patently false. 
While it would be silly to swim against the tide and resist changes 
in the legal profession that are inevitable products of a growingly 
 
 275. See Wald, supra note 273, at 1824. 
 276. See ABEL, supra note 41, at 9; Wilkins, supra note 18, at 1152–54. 
 277. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Implications of Strategic Alliances with U.S. Law 
Schools, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming); Markoff, supra note 274; Stashenko, supra 
note 274. 
 278. See Richard A. Matasar, The Viability of the Law Degree: Cost, Value, and 
Intrinsic Worth, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1579, 1621–25 (2011); TAMANAHA, supra note 15, 
at 167–71. 
 279. See id. at 172–76. 
 280. See id. at 174. 
 281. See id. 
 282. See Chambliss, supra note 277. 
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global market, it is also unwise to embrace all the changes without 
contemplating what, if any, aspects of the profession are worth trying 
to preserve.  This Article offers one caution.  The idea of a unified 
legal profession and the rhetoric that accompanies it is useful.  It has, 
among other things, served those on the periphery as a narrative of 
success.  It has provided a story not just about financial gain but about 
movement from the irrelevant outskirts of an alien nation to the 
center, in which the newcomer (or her children) may shape the rules 
and values of the world in which she lives. 
Even before the nation felt the full extent of the 2008 financial 
collapse, some scholars suggested that this version of the American 
Dream is dying.  In an article in the literary and political magazine 
N+1, law professor and political theorist Aziz Rana argued that 
President Obama could not attract a popular following because his 
message of success through hard work, merit, and professional 
education is no longer accessible to most.283  In his campaign, Obama 
claimed (much like I have argued here) that his position as an 
outsider, as the child of a racially mixed marriage who made his way 
in through professional success, situated him perfectly to fight for 
equal opportunity.284  Obama’s message, quite similar to that of Julius 
Henry Cohen, rang hollow.  The American public viewed him as 
elitist and, ironically, his opponent John McCain—a child of 
privilege—as a man of the people.285  This, Rana argued, is because 
the professional version of the American Dream is inherently elitist.286  
It assumes that only a precious few will rise up through its ranks. 
In this way, Julius Henry Cohen is, perhaps, a relic.  Perhaps his 
use of professionalism is antiquated like most of the others.  
However, it is precisely the blend of elitism and equality in the 
professional ideal that makes it relevant and worth salvaging.  It is the 
exclusivity that offers the real promise of success.  Of course, if the 
predictions are correct and access to the good life through 
professional advancement is really ossified then the promise is empty.  
But, this is, at least in part, a self-fulfilling prophecy.  If we abandon 
the rhetoric of professionalism and allow it to fall by the wayside 
along with the other versions of the American Dream, we are 
essentially capitulating.  The ideal gives individuals and the 
 
 283. See Aziz Rana, Obama and the Closing of the American Dream, N+1 (Sept. 
8, 2008), http://www.nplusonemag.com/obama. 
 284. See id. 
 285. See id. 
 286. See id. 
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community as a whole something to strive for and demand.  As long 
as that is not completely futile, then it is worthwhile to maintain the 
legal profession’s promise and try to make good on it. 
Of course, there are concerns along the way.  If the myth of a 
unified profession persists, if the frontier has not yet disappeared 
completely, then regulators need to be careful that they do not carry 
the ideal beyond its useful limits.  Professionalism can serve the useful 
purpose this Article has identified without serving the pernicious 
purposes that others have correctly noted before me.  There is no 
reason, after all, why all lawyers practicing in different areas need to 
be governed by the same ethical rules.287  There is no reason why the 
rhetoric of the professions needs to dictate severe entry requirements 
and outdated rules against competition.  There is no reason why the 
notion of a profession, with a singular role in finding and promoting a 
common good in society, needs to support rules restricting 
multidisciplinary practice or barring innovative ways to finance 
litigation.  In other words, the rhetoric of the professions has been 
used to justify a lot of unnecessary monopolistic conduct.  It has been 
used to resist change and hold onto outmoded ways of practice.  The 
rhetoric can be divorced from these side effects and used to further its 
more constructive purpose. 
 
 
 287. See Wilkins, supra note 18, at 1216–17. 
